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EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY AND GROWTH IN 





The paper investigates the impact of exchange rate volatility on growth in Emerging Europe 
and East Asia. Exchange stability has been argued to affect growth negatively as it deprives 
countries from the ability to react in a flexible way to asymmetric real shocks and may 
enhance the probability of speculative capital inflows and overheating. In contrast, exchange 
rate stability can be argued to affect growth in emerging market economies positively because 
transaction costs for international trade decline, uncertainty for international capital flows is 
less and macroeconomic stability is enhanced. Cross country panel estimations provide 
evidence for a negative impact of exchange rate volatility on growth both in Emerging Europe 
and East Asia.  
JEL Code: F43, F31, E42. 
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After the 1997/98 Asian crisis a controversial discussion about the pros and cons of exchange rate 
stabilization has emerged. Proponents of flexible exchange rates have argued that fixed exchange 
rates encourage speculative capital inflows, moral hazard and overinvestment. The economic pol-
icy implication is to pursue fully (more) flexible exchange rate regimes (Fischer 2001). In con-
trast proponents of fixed exchange rates have stressed the positive impact of exchange rate stabil-
ity on the economic performance of the East Asian economies.  McKinnon and Schnabl (2003, 
2004a) emphasize the role of low transaction costs for international and intra-regional trade and 
capital flows. 
 
In the decade after the Asian crisis Emerging Europe and East Asia have taken different direc-
tions on the path towards more (less) exchange rate stability. Emerging Europe, i.e. the central, 
eastern and south-eastern European countries have further strengthened their institutional and 
economic linkages with the European Union. This has led to a wider use of the euro as an invoic-
ing, vehicle, banking, pegging, intervention and reserve currency and more exchange rate stability 
against the euro (ECB 2006, Kamps 2006). In contrast, in East Asia post-crisis exchange rate 
volatility against the US dollar steadily declined up to the year 2005, but has increased since then. 
China and many other East Asian countries seem to follow (hesitantly) international policy rec-
ommendations in favour of more exchange rate flexibility.       
 
What will be the impact of the different exchange rate strategies on economic growth in the two 
regions? Up to the Asian crisis, an – for emerging market economies – exceptional degree of the 
international and intra-regional exchange rate stability has been regarded as an important pillar of 
the East Asian miracle (World Bank 1993, McKinnon 2005). Now Asia seems to move towards 
(more) exchange rate flexibility (against the dollar) average regional growth has declined. In con-
trast, Emerging Europe has experienced high exchange rate volatility during most of the 1990s. 
Since exchange rates have started to stabilize in the late 1990s growth rates are high.   
 
Does this imply that ceteris paribus the long-run growth perspective will be better for Emerging 
Europe than for East Asia? Or do stable exchange rates against the euro encourage speculative 
capital inflows which in the long-run will deteriorate Emerging Europe’s growth performance? 
Previous research on the impact of exchange stability on growth has tended to find weak evidence 
in favour of a positive impact of exchange rate stability on growth. For large country samples 
such as by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003) there is weak evidence that exchange rate stability af-
  1fects growth in a positive or negative way. The panel estimations for more than 180 countries by 
Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) find evidence that countries with more flexible exchange rates 
grow faster. Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) reveal a strong negative relationship between ex-
change rate stability and growth for 12 countries over 120 years. They conclude that the results of 
such estimations strongly depend on the time period and the sample.  
 
While many previous studies have chosen very large samples to increase the robustness of the 
estimation process we approach the question from a different angle. We test for the impact of  
exchange rate volatility on growth for two groups of countries in the economic catch-up process 
which have widely dismantled capital controls. This allows us to control for the impact of capital 
controls which facilitate exchange rate stability but which are detrimental for the growth perform-
ance. The comparison of two groups of countries which have pursued different exchange rate 
strategies at different points of time are expected to yield enough heterogeneity in the cross-
country panel to isolate a significant impact of exchange rate volatility on growth.  
 
Building upon De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005a) and Schnabl (2006), we perform GLS panel esti-
mations for 17 countries in Emerging Europe and 9 East Asian countries. In addition we use 10 
South American countries as a control group. The results provide evidence in favour of a robust 
negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and growth.  
  
2. Regional Trends in Exchange Rate Volatility 
Since the late 1970s the East Asian emerging economies
1 kept their exchange rates tightly pegged 
to the US dollar (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004a). This common dollar peg not only maintained 
exchange rate stability against the US as the most important (single) trading partner, but also en-
sured an exceptional degree of intra-regional exchange rate stability. McKinnon (2005) argues 
that this “informal dollar standard” was the basis for a high degree of intra-regional partition of 
labour and export-oriented growth. Both factors are linked to the East Asia economic miracle 
(World Bank 1993). China joined the East Asian dollar standard in 1994 when it pegged its ex-
change rate tightly to the dollar.  
 
The intra-regional exchange rate stability in East Asia was high until the 1997/98 Asian crisis 
interrupted the fast economic catch-up. Post-crisis exchange rate stability against the US re-
                                                 
1   Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.   
  2approached the pre-crisis levels up to the year 2004 (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004b). Since the 
year 2005 East Asian exchange rate volatility against the dollar has increased (Figure 1). For in-
stance, China and Malaysia have loosened their tight dollar pegs and have allowed for gradual 
appreciations of their currencies since then. Korea has allowed for an unprecedented degree of 
exchange rate volatility against the dollar. This may reflect international policy recommendations 
in favour of more exchange rate flexibility in East Asia (Fisher 2001).  
 
Figure 1: Exchange Rate Volatility in Emerging Europe (against the Euro) and in East Asia 


















Source: IMF: IFS. Volatility defined as two year rolling standard deviations of monthly percent changes 
against the respective anchor currency. Country groups as defined in Table 1 are calculated as arithmetic 




While East Asia seems to move from exchange rate stability to (more) exchange rate flexibility, 
Emerging Europe is moving into the opposite direction. During most of the 1990s exchange rate 
volatility in the region has been high for two reasons. First, most of the countries in central, east-
ern and south-eastern Europe experienced a high degree of macroeconomic instability and depre-
ciations of their currencies. Second, various types of exchange rate pegs (hard pegs, downward 
crawling pegs, currency baskets) had different anchors. Some countries pegged their currencies to 
the German Mark (Estonia, Croatia) others to the dollar (Lithuania, Romania) or currency baskets 
  3(Latvia, Hungary, Czech Republic). The outcome was high intra-regional exchange rate instabil-
ity which can be linked to weak intra-regional trade linkages.  
 
Since the late 1990s exchange rate stability in Emerging Europe has increased steadily. The ac-
cession of the central, eastern und south-eastern European countries to the European Union
2 re-
quired macroeconomic stabilization which led to a substantial decline in exchange rate volatility. 
Although some countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic moved to more exchange rate 
flexibility since the late 1990s intra-regional exchange rate stability increased as many countries 
re-pegged their currencies from the dollar to the euro (e.g. Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania) or sub-
stituted currencies baskets by unilateral euro pegs (e.g. Latvia, Hungary).  
 
The redirection of the exchange rate targets towards the euro has both institutional and economic 
reasons. From an institutional perspective all countries (except the UK and Denmark) which join 
the European Union have to join – sooner or later – the European Monetary Union (EMU). From 
an economic perspective the integration into the European goods and capital markets makes ex-
change rate stability against the euro beneficial as transaction costs decline for an increasing share 
of international goods and capital flows. Also non-EU countries such as Albania, Croatia or the 
FYR Macedonia peg their currencies more or less tightly to the euro. Among the European coun-
tries, only Turkey maintains (partially) a (loose) dollar peg.  
 
Figure 2 shows the different degrees of exchange rate volatility for Emerging Europe and East 
Asia both against the euro (before 1999 DM) and the dollar (unweighted averages). The upper 
panel depicts exchange rate volatility for Emerging Europe. During most of the 1990s exchange 
rate volatility was high both against the dollar and the German mark. Since the late 1990s ex-
change rate volatility against the euro has become significantly lower than against the dollar and 
has steadily declined. In East Asia as shown in the lower panel of Figure 2 exchange rate volatil-
ity against the dollar has been very low compared to exchange rate volatility against the euro 
(German mark before 1999) since the early 1980s except for the 1997/98 crisis period. Since the 





                                                 
2   Besides the countries which have already joined the European Union, Turkey, Croatia and the FYR Macedonia 
have the status of candidate countries, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro are potential candi-
date countries.  














































Source: IMF: IFS. Volatility defined as two year rolling standard deviations of monthly percent changes. 
Country groups calculated as arithmetic averages. The country groups are defined in Table 1. The German 
mark represents the euro before January 1999. 
  5Figure 3 provides an overview over the growth performance of the two regions. Growth is de-
fined as the arithmetic average of the countries represented in the respective group as listed in 
Table 1. We observe a very high level of growth for the East Asian countries up to the Asian cri-
sis. After the crisis the average growth in East Asia has picked up again, but has declined com-
pared to the pre-crisis period. In contrast, in Emerging Europe growth was low at the beginning of 
the transformation process and jumped to a high level during the second half the late 1990s. This 
may suggest a negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and growth. 
 
























Source: IMF. Arithmetic averages. 
 
3. Theoretical Evidence  
The increasing degree of exchange rate stability in Emerging Europe and the (past) high degree of 
exchange rate stability in East Asia pose the question of why emerging market countries stabilize 
exchange rates. The effects of the exchange rate volatility on growth can be seen as a comprehen-
sive measure of the benefits and costs of exchange rate stabilization. The following section sur-
veys the role of asymmetric shocks, international trade and international capital markets as the 
most important transmission channels from exchange rate volatility (stability) to growth.  
 
 
  63.1 Asymmetric shocks  
Flexible exchange rates have been regarded as an important tool to cope with asymmetric (real) 
shocks (Meade 1951, Friedman 1953). The reason is that under fixed exchange rate regimes real 
exchange rate adjustments have to be carried out through relative price and productivity changes 
which in a world of price and wage rigidities are slow and costly. The outcome is a lower growth 
performance.  
 
Mundell’s (1961) seminal paper on optimum currency areas (OCA) extended the argument to a 
monetary union. Interpreting monetary and exchange rate policies as Keynesian instruments of 
adjustment, Mundell (1961) argued that shock absorption within a heterogeneous group of coun-
tries is easier if monetary and exchange rate policies remain independent. In particular for country 
groups with rigid labour markets and low international labour mobility, monetary autonomy was 
regarded as crucial. Today, Mundell’s (1961) OCA theory remains the most important theoretical 
framework to analyse the pro and cons of EMU enlargement (Fidrmuc and Korhonen 2006). 
 
In contrast, McKinnon (1963) emphasized the benefits of fixed exchange rate regimes for small 
open economies in the face of nominal shocks. Assuming that for small open economies the in-
ternational price level is given and traded goods make up a high share of the domestically con-
sumed goods, exchange rate stability ensures domestic price stability. The welfare effect of stable 
exchange rates originates in macroeconomic stability which provides a favourable environment 
for investment, consumption and growth. From this perspective, as acknowledged by Mundell 
(1973a, 1973b) in later works, monetary and exchange rate policies are regarded as a source of 
uncertainty and volatility in small open economies. Growth is stimulated when exchange rate 
fluctuations are smoothed.  
 
3.2 International Trade 
The welfare gains from the international partition of labour are widely acknowledged. The eco-
nomic policy implication is to remove exchange rate volatility to foster trade and higher growth.  
 
The impact of exchange rate volatility on trade among two or a group of countries has both a mi-
cro- and macroeconomic dimension. From a microeconomic perspective exchange rate volatility 
– for instance measured as day-to-day or week-to-week exchange rate fluctuations – is associated 
with higher transactions costs because uncertainty is high and hedging foreign exchange risk is 
costly. Indirectly, fixed exchange rates enhance international price transparency as consumers can 
  7compare prices in different countries more easily. If exchange rate volatility is eliminated, inter-
national arbitrage enhances efficiency, productivity and welfare. These microeconomic benefits 
of exchange rate stabilization have been a pivotal motivation of the European (monetary) integra-
tion process (European Commission 1990) which can be regarded as the most comprehensive and 
advanced approach to eliminate intra-regional exchange rate fluctuations.  
 
The macroeconomic dimension arises from the fact that long-term exchange rate fluctuations – 
for instance measured as monthly or yearly changes of the exchange rate level – affect the com-
petitiveness of domestic export and import competing industries. In specific in small open 
economies the growth performance is strongly influenced by long-term fluctuations of the ex-
change rate level. Even comparatively closed economies such as the euro area and Japan are sen-
sitive to large exchange rate swings, in particular in the case of appreciation. McKinnon and 
Ohno (1997) show for Japan that since the early 1970s – when the yen became flexible against 
the dollar – growth was negatively influenced by the appreciation of the Japanese currency.  
 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) argue for the small open East Asian economies, that the fluctua-
tions of the Japanese yen against the US dollar strongly affected the growth performance of the 
East Asian tiger economies. They identify trade with Japan and competition in third markets (US) 
as crucial transmission channels. Before 1995 the appreciation of the Japanese yen against the 
dollar enhanced the competitiveness of the smaller East Asian economies who kept their ex-
change rates pegged to the dollar. Economic growth in the region accelerated. Then, the strong 
deprecation of the yen against the dollar from 1995 into 1997 slowed down growth in Japans 
small neighbouring countries, contributing to the 1997/98 Asian crisis.  
 
Although the short-term and long-term exchange rate swings can strongly affect the growth per-
formance of open economies through the trade channel the empirical evidence in favour of a sys-
tematic positive (or negative) effect of exchange rate stability on trade (and thereby growth) has 
remained mixed (IMF 1984, European Commission 1990). Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) 
find based on a general equilibrium framework that exchange rate stability is not necessarily as-
sociated with more trade. Gravity models have been used as frameworks to quantify the impact of 
exchange rate stability on trade and growth in particular in the context of a monetary union. 
While the size of the coefficient by Frankel and Rose (2002) seems to exaggerate the trade effects 
of a monetary union, Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003) find that in its early years the European 
Monetary Union has increased trade by up to 16%.  
  84.3 Capital Markets 
Capital markets have been playing an increasing role in the discussion about exchange rate stabi-
lization and growth since the Asian crisis (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999, McKinnon and 
Schnabl 2004a, De Grauwe and Schnabl 2005a, Aghion et al. 2006). The impact of exchange 
rates on economic growth via capital markets has both a short-term (microeconomic) and a long-
term (macroeconomic) dimension.  
 
From a short-term perspective, fixed exchange rates can foster economic growth by a more effi-
cient international allocation of capital when transaction costs for capital flows are removed 
(McKinnon 1973). If international capital market segmentations are dismantled debtors in high 
yield emerging market economies benefit from a substantial decline in interest rates due to in-
vestment from low yield developed capital markets (Dornbusch 2001). The authorities in the 
emerging market debtor countries have an incentive to maintain capital inflows by dismantling 
capital controls and by providing an efficient financial supervision (Mehl, Vespro and Winkler 
2005).   
 
From a more long-term perspective, fluctuations in the exchange rate level constitute a risk for 
growth in emerging markets economies as they affect the balance sheets of banks and enterprises 
of which foreign debt tends to be denominated in foreign currency (Eichengreen and Hausmann 
1999)   Sharp depreciations inflate the liabilities in terms of domestic currency thereby increasing 
the probability of default and crisis. In debtor countries with highly euroized (dollarized) financial 
sectors, the incentive to avoid sharp exchange rate fluctuations is even stronger (Aghion et. al. 
2006). Maintaining the exchange rate at a constant level, in particular preventing sharp deprecia-
tions, is equivalent to maintaining growth (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004a).   
 
 2.4 Boom-and-Bust-Cycles 
Although as shown above, fixed exchange rates can support growth in small open economies by 
encouraging (low interest rate) international capital inflows, speculative capital inflows into coun-
tries with shallow capital markets can contribute to excess volatility and crisis (Backé, Égert and 
Zumer 2007, Martin, Schuknecht and Vansteenkiste 2007).  
 
                                                 
3 The impact of exchange rate fluctuations in the case of asset dollarization is explored by McKinnon and Schnabl 
(2004b). 
  9During the 1970s and 1980s crisis in emerging market economies was associated with unsound 
macroeconomic policies, in particular in Latin American countries. The interdependence of vola-
tile macroeconomic policies and crisis is reflected in the first generation of crisis models (e.g. 
Krugman 1979). In contrast, the East Asian crisis economies provide an example for boom-and-
bust cycles which are driven by “good governance” in macroeconomic policies including fixed 
exchange rate strategies. Before the 1997/98 crisis the East Asian emerging tiger economies at-
tracted international capital flows (inter alia) for two reasons. First, the East Asian economies 
pursued favourable macroeconomic polices, i.e. low inflation and low government deficits. Sec-
ond, the fixed exchange regimes helped attracting international capital inflows as they provided 
implicit guarantees to reconvert investment at constant exchange rates against the dollar.  
 
Both factors interact. To maintain fixed exchange rates in the long-term, macroeconomic stability 
and flexibility are required. In particular labour markets have to adjust to asymmetric shocks. 
Such good macroeconomic performance attracts capital inflows. Interest rates decline. Invest-
ment, consumption and growth accelerate. As tax incomes rise due to the buoyant domestic activ-
ity, governments can keep deficits low. Capital inflows are additionally accelerated if interest 
rates in the large capital markets are low. For instance, in the case of the East Asian emerging 
economies in the mid 1990s capital inflows were further accelerated by historically low interest 
rates in Japan which boosted carry trade and the hunt for yield in Japan’s small East Asian 
neighbouring countries (Schnabl und Starbatty 1998).  
 
The downside of virtuous circles of sound macroeconomic performance and capital inflows as 
observed in East Asia before the year 1997 is the threat of inflation. While in pre-crisis East Asia, 
consumer price inflation remained comparatively moderate, inflation rose above the level in the 
US as buoyant capital inflows were translated through foreign exchange intervention into mone-
tary expansion. Given that exchange rates were kept – by and large – constant the East Asian cur-
rencies appreciated in real terms. Current account deficits and financial account surpluses in-
creased. The foreign currency denominated external debt and the exposure of the banking sectors 
increased.
4 Inflation became most visible in the real estate and stock markets where prices in-
creased fast providing evidence of asset price bubbles and overheating.     
 
In East Asia, the currency and financial crisis started with speculation against the dollar pegs 
which reflected rising concerns about the sustainability of the East Asian boom. The waves of 
  10speculation ended with the collapse of the dollar pegs of five East Asian crisis economies which 
rendered the banking sectors bankrupt. The outcome was severe recessions (Figure 3) which were 
further deepened by IMF austerity programs. The East Asian crisis was propagated to the other 
East Asian non crisis economies which were affected through several transmission channels such 
as trade, capital flows and FDI.  The outcome for the East Asian non-crisis economies was most 
severe for Japan where the Asian crisis caused falling stock prices at the Tokyo stock exchange 
which finally cumulated in the Japanese financial crisis.  
 
The lesson drawn from the currency attacks on the East Asian debtor economies was that the pre-
1997 system of “soft” dollar pegs itself was at fault (Fischer 2001). Before 1997, because of high 
risk premiums – which helped to sustain capital inflows when current account deficits increased – 
the interest rates in the East Asian debtor economies were much higher than on dollar or yen as-
sets. Domestic banks were tempted to accept low-interest dollar (or yen) deposits instead of rela-
tively high-interest baht deposits. The temptation to risk foreign exchange exposure was all the 
greater because exchange rates were (softly) fixed.  
 
The answer of if flexible exchange rates would reduce the risk of crisis is not straightforward and 
depends on the central bank’s response to appreciation pressure. Let’s assume a situation of 
strong capital inflows which are driven by both favourable macroeconomic conditions in the 
emerging market economy and low interest rates in the large industrialized countries. This would 
bring the currency of the emerging market economy under appreciation pressure. If the central 
banks allow for appreciation and if appreciation expectations become sustained, additional specu-
lative capital inflows will be encouraged.
5 Under such circumstances the likelihood increases that 
the central bank will intervene in foreign exchange markets against “excessive appreciation” and 
that the capital inflows will be translated into a rising money supply. Compared to a fixed ex-
change rate regime the monetary expansion may be larger because sustained appreciation expec-
tations encourage additional capital inflows. The probability of overheating further rises. 
 
Only if the central bank allows for “uncontrolled appreciation” of the domestic currency, the 
probability of crisis declines because the sharp appreciation of the domestic currency deteriorates 
the economic outlook. The negative impact of appreciation on growth will be particularly strong 
                                                                                                                                                               
4    Concerning the impact of the currency denomination of external debt and the probability of crisis see Eichengreen 
and Hausmann (1999) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2004a). 
5   For countries in the economic catch-up process with inflation targeting frameworks the probability of apprecia-
tion is even higher due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect which implies a nominal appreciation if the inflation rate 
is kept close to the level of the reference economy (De Grauwe and Schnabl 2005b).  
  11in small open economies because the share of exports of GDP is high and domestic activity is 




The upshot is that the policy choice of fully flexible exchange rates will be difficult to politically 
defend. This is even more the case when GDP per capita is low (as currently in China) and if 
neighbouring countries with fixed exchange rate regimes experience high growth due to buoyant 
capital inflows. Discretionary foreign exchange intervention in times of appreciation becomes 
likely. This may imply that the central bank “jumps” between domestic targets of monetary policy 
making (for instance inflation targets) in times of a weak currency and exchange rate targets in 
times of a strong currency.
7 The outcome would be more uncertainty with respect to monetary 
policy making which can be linked to higher risk premiums on interest rates and thereby lower 
growth (Schnabl 2006).    
 
This leads to the long-term cost-benefit-analysis. Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes can 
better benefit from buoyant international capital inflows, but risk a higher probability of crisis.
8 
Emerging market economies with fully flexible exchange rate regimes won’t be able to fully reap 
the gains of international capital inflows, as appreciation pressure will slow down growth as soon 
as capital inflows allow for an acceleration of the economic catch-up process. “Intermediate re-
gimes” which intervene occasionally against “excessive appreciation” may even face a higher 
probability of crisis than countries with hard pegs if sustained appreciation expectations encour-
age additional speculative capital inflows. If capital inflows are curtailed by strict capital controls, 
domestic interest rates increase and growth will slow down as well 
 
The upshot is that in the absence of a first best solution, in the long run credibly fixed exchange 
rates are the (second) best solution despite a rising probability of overheating. In this context Ran-
ciere, Tornell and Westermann (2003) argue that although there is a robust positive relationship 
between the speed of the economic catch-up and crisis, countries which provide favourable condi-
tions for capital inflows – for instance by open capital accounts, macroeconomic  and exchange 
rate stability – grow faster in the long run.   
                                                 
6     In Japan this effect is called high yen induced recession (endaka fukyo) (McKinnon and Ohno 1997). 
7    Danne and Schnabl (2007) explore the asymmetric impact of the exchange rate on Japanese monetary policy mak-
ing during the economic catch-up. 
8   This hypothesis implies that the respective countries’ macroeconomic policies are flexible enough to maintain the 
peg. If this is not the case, as in Argentina, a flexible exchange rate regime may be the better policy choice. 
  124. Empirical Investigation 
Given the pro and cons about fixed exchange rates in emerging market economies the question 
about the impact of the exchange rate volatility on growth remains an empirical matter which is 
scrutinized here for Emerging Europe and East Asia. This investigation builds upon De Grauwe 
and Schnabl (2005a) for the new EU member states and Schnabl (2006) for the EMU periphery.  
 
4.1. Sample, Observation Period, and Volatility Measures 
To identify the effect of exchange rate volatility on growth, we specify an unbalanced cross-
country panel model for 17 Emerging European countries and 9 East Asian countries. In addition 
we use 10 South American countries as a control group (Table 1 provides an overview). First, we 
include 17 central, eastern and south-eastern European countries which have already joined the 
European Union or are associated with the EU enlargement process as candidate or potential can-
didate countries. Serbia and Montenegro are excluded because of insufficient data. Most central, 
eastern and south-eastern European countries have redirected their exchange rate policies towards 
the euro.  
 
Second, we include nine East Asian countries, namely China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Phil-
ippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. As outlined in section 2 the East Asian 
emerging economies have pegged their currencies commonly to the dollar (East Asian dollar 
standard) (McKinnon 2005). The common dollar peg has been regarded as growth enhancing, but 
we are not aware of any investigation which provides empirical evidence. 
 
The data sources are the IMF International Financial Statistics, the IMF World Economic Outlook 
and the national central banks. We use yearly data, as for some countries data are only available 
on a yearly basis. The volatility measures are calculated as yearly averages of monthly percent 
exchange rate changes. The sample period starts for Emerging Europe in 1994. Because a sub-
stantial part of the sample consists of (former) transition economies, the pre-1994 data are unsta-
ble and very fragmented. The time period is up to the present (2005). 
 
To test for the impact of exchange rate volatility on economic growth, we use de facto volatility 
measures, because de jure volatility measures have proved to be flawed by “fear of floating” 
(Calvo and Reinhart 2002, McKinnon and Schnabl 2004a, De Grauwe and Schnabl 2005a). Ex-
change rate volatility can be measured in four ways. First, oscillations around a constant level as 
  13measured by the standard deviation of percent exchange rate changes (σ) can be seen as a proxy 
for uncertainty and transactions costs for international trade and short-term capital flows.  
 
Second, the arithmetic average of percent exchange rate changes (μ) can be seen as a measure for 
changes in the exchange rate level, i.e. for “beggar-thy-neighbour” depreciations (positive sign) 
or a sustained appreciation pressure (negative sign) for the respective economy. Both measures 
are summarized by the z-score (
2 2
t t t z σ μ + = ) as proposed by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003). 
Fourth, a sustained appreciation or depreciation path can be captured by yearly relative exchange 
rate changes (γ) comparing January with December. Appreciations exhibit a negative sign, depre-
ciations a positive sign. 
 
All four volatility measures are calculated against the euro and the dollar. We compute a mini-
mum measure for exchange rate volatility which includes the smaller volatility either against the 
euro or the dollar. This is important for the Emerging European countries which have tended to 
switch their exchange rate targets from the dollar to the euro. For the East Asian countries and the 
South American countries the volatility measures are only calculated against the dollar. 
  
4.2. Model Specification and Estimation Procedure 
We use a cross-country panel data model that explains economic growth by exchange rate volatil-
ity and a set of control variables:
9
 
it i it i it v w ε δ γ + + = '   ,                         (1) 
 
where wit is the vector of yearly real growth rates from 1994 to 2005. The explanatory variable vit 
consists of the indicators of exchange rate volatility (σ, μ, z, γ) and the control variables. 
 
We use standard deviations of monthly exchange rate changes (σ) and January over December 
percent exchange rate changes (γ) as measures for exchange rate volatility. Alternatively, the z-
score as a comprehensive measure of both is used.
10 As discussed in section 2 there are three 
main transmission channels from exchange rate stability to growth: interest rates, trade and mac-
roeconomic stability. Exchange rate stability is expected to be linked with lower interest rates, 
                                                 
9   See Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2003) and Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) for a similar approach. 
10   Yearly percent exchange rate changes are correlated with the means of monthly percent exchange rate changes.  
  14more trade and lower inflation. We use short-term money market interest rates as a proxy for the 
interest rate channel. Yearly percent changes of exports in terms of US dollar are used as a proxy 
for the trade channel. Yearly CPI inflation is used as a proxy for macroeconomic stability.  
 
We include dummies for crisis in emerging markets such as for the 1997/98 Asian crisis, the 1998 
Russian crisis and several crises in Latin America (1980-1983, 1994-1995, 1999-2002). The crisis 
dummies can be seen as a measure for asymmetric shocks. We also include dummies for inflation 
targeting regimes which are associated with exchange rate flexibility.  
 
There are a large number of other macroeconomic variables which affect growth and therefore 
may be considered as control variables such as investment, consumption and government spend-
ing. Including these variables into the specification increases the fit of the model, but also de-
creases the degrees of freedom. In addition, in small open economies most macroeconomic vari-
ables are influenced by exchange rate volatility as they are strongly dependent on interest rates, 
trade and inflation. For this reason, we restrict the control variables to the variables described 
above.  
 
4.3. Estimation Results 
Both a generalized least square fixed effect (GLS) model as well as a GMM framework are used 
for the estimations.
11 The fixed effect specification models the heterogeneity of the countries in 
the sample. We choose the General Least Squares model as baseline framework, because the con-
cern about endogeneity between growth and the exchange rate regime is low. Within the sample 
of emerging market economies, fast (slow) growing countries can not be argued to adopt system-
atically either a fixed or a flexible exchange rate regime. Macroeconomic stability as it is ensured 
by institutional reforms can be argued to affect both the growth performance and the ability to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. If the degree of institutional reforms is not included as a 
control variable this could cause an omitted variable bias. To control for this bias we use inflation 
as a proxy for institutional reforms.  
 
In addition, there is a concern of endogeneity with respect to the control variables, because trade, 
interest rates and dollar exports affect growth but are also likely to be affected by the growth per-
formance. To control for this endogeneity bias with respect to the control variables we use a dy-
                                                 
11   Random effect models lead to by and large the same results. 
  15namic GMM specification as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover 
(1995). The results from the GLS and GMM specifications remain widely unchanged.  
 
Emerging Europe  
The estimation results for Emerging Europe with respect to exchange rate volatility against the 
euro provide evidence in favor of a negative correlation between exchange rate volatility and 
growth. The GLS specification for the whole sample with all control variables provides (rows (1) 
and (2)) evidence that exchange rate volatility against the euro has a clearly negative impact on 
growth (Table 2). Both the coefficients for the standard deviations and the z-scores are negative 
and significant at the 1%-level. For the yearly change rate the evidence is mixed. Depending on 
the specification the sign and significance levels change.  
 
The proxies for the transmission channels have the expected signs and are mostly significant at 
the common levels. Higher interest rates are associated with lower growth at very significant lev-
els. Export growth is positively linked to higher growth, also at very significant levels. Inflation is 
associated with lower growth, but at lower significance levels. The dummy for inflation targeting 
has a negative sign and is significant in few specifications suggesting that countries with inflation 
targeting frameworks may experience lower growth.
12 For the Emerging European countries 
which have not experienced a region wide crisis during the observation period
13, the crisis 
dummy remains insignificant.  
 
Different specifications (rows (3) to (8)) which exclude one or the other control variable show a 
stable negative relationship between the z-score and growth. Also the negative sign for the stan-
dard deviations is robust. In contrast, without controlling for interest rates, export growth and 
inflation the coefficient for the yearly exchange rate changes the sign suggesting that appreciation 
(depreciation) is associated with higher (lower) growth. The GMM specification as reported in 
Table 3 yields – by and large – unchanged results. The sign of the standard deviations and z-
scores are in all specifications negative and mostly highly significant indicating a clearly negative 
impact of exchange rate volatility on growth. The transmission channels have the expected signs 
and are mostly significant.  
                                                 
12   There are many explanations why this could be the case for the underlying sample but this finding would not be 
valid in general. One explanation is that inflation targeting frameworks are used as tools for disinflation which 
lead to negative growth effects in the short-term but would lead to higher long-term growth. Lower growth in 
countries with inflation targeting regimes would be also in line with findings that inflation targeting is associated 
with lower output volatility because a lower level of growth is linked to less output volatility.  
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An alternative specification estimates the impact of exchange rate volatility on growth for the 
volatility measure which uses the lowest volatility either against the euro or the dollar (Min) (Ta-
ble 4 and Table 5). The minimum volatility measure can be regarded as a more precise proxy for 
exchange rate volatility in the region as some countries in Emerging Europe peg their exchange 
rates against the dollar or had pegged their exchange rates against the dollar in the early part of 
our sample period. The estimation results are very similar for the GLS (Table 4) and GMM (Ta-
ble 5) specification suggesting a robust negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and 
growth. Inflation targeting frameworks seem to have a negative impact on growth, but remain 
widely insignificant. 
 
All in all, this suggests that Emerging Europe’s move from high exchange rate volatility to in-
creasing exchange rate stability (against the euro) has brought substantial benefits in terms of 
higher growth. The R-squares suggest that substantial information is drawn from both the time 
and country dimension of the panel. The benefits arise from lower interest rates, more exports and 
a higher degree of macroeconomic stability. This confirms the role of interest rates, trade and 
macroeconomic stability as transmission channels. The anchor currency does not seem to matter 
for the impact of the exchange rate regime on growth as both exchange rate stabilization against 
the euro and against the dollar seem to ensure low interest rates (if impediments to international 
capital flows are removed) and macroeconomic stability.  
 
East Asia 
Before the crisis East Asia has been regarded as a role model for the positive impact of (intra-
regional) exchange rate stability on (export-led) growth (McKinnon 2005). The observation pe-
riod for East Asia is considerably longer than for Emerging Europe due to better data availability. 
The sample starts in 1980 when most countries in the sample had adopted export-oriented indus-
trialization strategies. Exchange rate volatility is calculated against the dollar. Note that for the 
East Asian sample the fit of the model is substantially larger than for the Emerging Europe sam-
ple. 
 
For the whole sample period the negative impact of exchange rate volatility on growth is strongly 
confirmed for both the GLS specification (Table 6). The coefficients of exchange rate volatility 
                                                                                                                                                               
13   Some countries were affected by crisis at different points of time such as Estonia by the Russian crisis in 1998 
and the Czech Republic in 1997.  
  17measured in terms of standard deviations and z-scores are negative and highly significant suggest-
ing a strong negative impact of exchange rate volatility on growth. Also the coefficient measuring 
appreciation (depreciation) of the East Asian currencies has the expected sign and is highly sig-
nificant. Appreciation (depreciation) is strongly associated with less (more) growth. This may 
explain the strong inclination of the East Asian countries to stabilize exchange rates against the 
dollar (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2003). 
 
The results for the controls variables have mostly the expected signs. Like for Emerging Europe, 
the specification with all control variables has the best fit. Exports have a strongly positive impact 
on growth. Macroeconomic instability (higher inflation) is associated with lower growth. In con-
trast to Emerging Europe the interest rate has not the expected sign and is insignificant. The 
dummy for the 1997/98 Asian crisis which controls for the negative impact of the volatility asso-
ciated with the crisis is clearly negative and highly significant. This reflects the fact that the East 
Asian crisis was much more severe in East Asia than the instabilities during the observation pe-
riod in Emerging Europe which tended to effect only single countries but not the whole country 
group.  
 
In line with Emerging Europe the dummy for inflation targeting frameworks is mostly negative, 
associating inflation targeting with lower growth. In contrast to Emerging Europe the coefficients 
remain widely insignificant. This may be due to two reasons. First, the impact of inflation target-
ing on growth is weak. Second, the East Asian countries have widely exhibited “fear of floating” 
even after they have adopted inflation targeting frameworks (Calvo and Reinhart 2002).  
 
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
The GMM estimation for the East Asian sample is not robust and therefore not reported here. To 
increase the sample size of the East Asian sample we add 10 South American countries to in-
crease the sample size (for composition of the country group see Table 1). In contrast to East 
Asia, the South American countries can be seen as a country group where macroeconomic and 
exchange rate instability prevailed during most of the observation period. The observation period 
for this pooled sample is from 1980 to 2005 for the GLS specification and from 1986 to 2005 for 
the GMM specification, because the GMM results are not stable for the 1980 to 2005 observation 
period. Both the GLS (Table 7) and GMM (Table 8) estimations confirm the results for the single 
country groups. 
 
  18 The coefficients for the standard deviations and z-scores are clearly negative and mostly highly 
significant for both estimation frameworks. Also the yearly exchange rate changes have (the ex-
pected) positive sign at highly significant levels. This implies a clearly negative impact of ex-
change rate volatility on growth for the pooled East Asian and South American sample. The role 
of the export growth and macroeconomic stability (inflation) as transmission channels is con-
firmed, while the results for interest rates remain mixed. 
 
A second set of robustness tests finally pools East Asia and Emerging Europe. As the Emerging 
European sample only starts in 1994, the observation period is restricted to 1994 to 2005. The 
results are reported in Table 9 (GLS) and Table 10 (GMM). Both the Emerging European and the 
East Asian sample provide evidence that exchange rate volatility is detrimental for growth. The 
control variables confirm the important role of international trade and macroeconomic stability as 
transmission channels from exchange rate stability to growth. For the interest rate channel the 
evidence is mixed.  
 
We pool Emerging Europe and East Asian to provide a comprehensive picture for the interde-
pendence of exchange rate volatility and growth in emerging market economies. The pooled sam-
ple allows for more heterogeneity within the sample. We restrict the pooled sample to the period 
from 1994 to 2005 as data are not available for Emerging Europe prior to the year 1994. The re-
sults are shown in Table 9 (GLS) and Table 10 (GMM). There is strong evidence that exchange 
rate volatility affects growth negatively if exchange rate volatility is measured in terms of stan-
dard deviations and z-scores.  
 
All in all, the negative impact of exchange rate volatility for economic growth seems to be robust 
suggesting that stable exchange rates are the better strategy for emerging market economies with 
underdeveloped capital markets and open capital accounts. The role of international trade, interest 
rates and macroeconomic stability as transmission channels is confirmed.  
5. Conclusion 
We have tested for the impact of exchange rate volatility on economic growth in Emerging 
Europe and East Asia which are country groups which have widely dismantled capital controls in 
the observation periods. While East Asia has traditionally maintained a high degree of exchange 
rate stability it has moved towards (slightly) more exchange rate volatility (against the dollar). 
Emerging Europe has continued to pursue increasingly exchange rate stability against the euro 
  19although some countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic have allowed their currencies to 
float substantially. 
 
We have shown that there is no straightforward theoretical evidence in favour of or against ex-
change rate stability in emerging market economies. Nevertheless, our empirical investigations 
suggest that emerging markets with fixed exchange rates grow faster. The reason is that fixed 
exchange rates have a positive impact on international trade, interest rates and macroeconomic 
stability.  As a pre-requisite capital controls have to be dismantled to allow for arbitrage in inter-
national goods and capital markets. Note that open capital accounts in combination with fixed 
exchange rates require macroeconomic stability and flexibility which are ensured by institutional 
reforms and therefore invite growth enhancing international capital flows.  
 
Despite the strong evidence in favour of a positive impact of exchange rate stability on growth the 
relationship between exchange rate stability and growth is not a linear one as discussed in section 
2.4. Favourable conditions for international investment may encourage speculative capital inflows 
and overheating as experienced in the case of the Asian crisis. This does not imply, however, that 
countries should per se adopt flexible exchange rate regimes to reduce the likelihood of crisis 
because the price would be a considerable lower level of growth due to increasing macroeco-
nomic instability under flexible exchange rate regimes.  A systematic analysis of the interdepend-
ence between stable exchange rates, macroeconomic stability and institutional reforms remains 
subject to further research. 
  20References 
Aghion, Philippe / Bachetta, Philippe / Ranciere, Romain / Rogoff, Kenneth 2005: Productivity 
Growth and the Exchange Rate Regime: the Role of Financial Development. NBER Working 
Paper 12117.    
Arellano, Manuel / Bond, Stephen 1991: Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic Studies  
58, 277–297. 
Arellano, Manuel / Bover, Olympia 1995: Another Look at the Instrumental-Variable Estimation 
of Error-Components Models. Journal of Econometrics 68, 29-51. 
Bachetta, Philippe / van Wincoop, Eric 2000: Does Exchange Rate Stability Increase Trade and 
Welfare? American Economic Review 90, 1093-1109. 
Backé, Peter / Egert, Balasz / Zumer, Tina 2006: Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe. 
ECB Working Paper 687. 
Calvo, Guillermo / Reinhart, Carmen 2002: Fear of Floating. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
117, 2, 379–408. 
Danne, Christian /  Schnabl, Gunther 2007: A Role Model for China? Exchange Rate Flexibility 
and Monetary Policy in Japan. Mimeo. 
De Grauwe, Paul / Schnabl, Gunther 2005a: Exchange Rate Regime and Macroeconomic Per-
formance in Central and Eastern Europe. CESifo Working Paper 1182.   
De Grauwe, Paul and Gunther Schnabl 2005b: Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to 
EMU Accession –  EMU Entry Scenarios for the New Member States. Kyklos 58, 4, 481-499. 
Dooley, Michael, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber 2003: An Essay on the Revived Bret-
ton Woods System. NBER Working Paper 9971. 
Dornbusch, Rüdiger 2001: Fewer Monies Better Monies, Discussion on Exchange Rates and the 
Choice of Monetary-Policy Regimes. American Economic Review 91, 238–242. 
Edwards, Sebastian / Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo 2003: Flexible Exchange Rates as Shock Absorbers, 
NBER Working Paper 9867. 
Eichengreen, Barry / Hausmann, Ricardo 1999: Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility. NBER 
Working Paper 7418. 
Eichengreen, Barry / Leblang, David 2003: Exchange Rates and Cohesion: Historical Perspec-
tives and Political-Economy Considerations. Journal of Common Market Studies 41, 797–822. 
European Central Bank (ECB) 2005: Review of the International Role of the Euro, Frankfurt. 
European Commission 1990: One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits 
and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union. European Economy 44. 
Fidrmuc, Jarko / Korhonen, Iikka 2006: Meta-Analysis of the Business Cycle Correlation be-
tween the Euro Area and the CEECs. Journal of Comparative Economics 34.  
Fischer, Stanley 2001: Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct? Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 15,  2, 3–24. 
Frankel, Jeffrey / Rose, Andrew 2002: An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade 
and Income. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 437–66. 
Friedman, Milton 1953: The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates. In Essays of Positive Economics, 
ed. by Milton Friedman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
Ghosh, Atish / Gulde, Anne-Marie / Wolf, Holger 2003: Exchange Rate Regimes: Choices and 
Consequences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
International Monetary Fund 1984: Exchange Rate Variability and World Trade, IMF Occasional 
Paper  28 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
Kamps, Annette 2006: The Euro as Invoicing Currency in International Trade. European Central 
Bank Working Paper 665. 
Krugman, Paul 1979: A Model of Balance of Payments Crisis. Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 11, 311-325. 
  21Martin, Rainer / Schuknecht, Ludger / Vansteenkiste, Isabell 2007: Boom and Bust Episodes and 
the Choice of Adjustment Strategy. Mimeo.  
McKinnon, Ronald 1963: Optimum Currency Areas. American Economic Review 53, 717–25. 
McKinnon, Ronald 1973: Money and Capital in Economic Development. Brookings Institution.  
McKinnon, Ronald 2005: Exchange Rates under the East Asian Dollar Standard: Living with 
Conflicted Virtue. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
McKinnon, Ronald / Ohno, Kenichi 1997: Dollar and Yen. Resolving Economic Conflict between 
the United States and Japan. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
McKinnon, Ronald / Schnabl, Gunther 2003: Synchronized Business Cycles in East Asia and 
Fluctuations in the Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate. The World Economy 26, 8, 1067-1088. 
McKinnon, Ronald and Gunther Schnabl 2004a: The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Float-
ing, and Original Sin. Review of Development Economics 8,  3,  331–60.  
McKinnon, Ronald and Gunther Schnabl 2004b: A Return to Soft Dollar Pegging in East Asia? 
Mitigating Conflicted Virtue. International Finance 7, 2, 169-201. 
Meade, James 1951: The Theory of International Economic Policy (London: Oxford University 
Press). 
Micco, Alejandro / Stein, Ernesto / Ordoñez, Guillermo 2003: The Currency Union Effect on 
Trade: Early Evidence from EMU. Economic Policy 18, 37,  315–56. 
Mundell, Robert 1961: A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas. American Economic Review 51, 4,  
657–65. 
Mundell, Robert 1973a: A Plan for a European Currency. In The Economics of Common Curren-
cies, ed. by Harry Johnson and Alexander Swoboda (London: Allen and Unwin).  
Mundell, Robert 1973b: Uncommon Arguments for Common Currencies. In The Economics of 
Common Currencies, ed. by Harry Johnson and Alexander Swoboda (London: Allen and Un-
win).  
Ranciere, Romain / Tornell, Aaron / Westermann, Frank 2005: Crisis and Growth: a RE-
Evaluation. NBER Working Paper 10073.   
Schnabl, Gunther 2006: Exchange Rate Volatility and Growth in Small Open Economies at the 
EMU Periphery.  Mimeo.  
World Bank 1993: The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford Univer-
sity Press.  
  22  23
Table 1: Sub-Samples 
  Countries   IFS County Code   Panel ID 
Emerging Europe  Bulgaria 918  1 
  Croatia 960  2 
  Romania 968  3 
  Turkey 186  4 
  Albania   914  5 
  Bosnia-Herzegovina 963  6 
  FYR Macedonia  962  7 
  Cyprus 423  8 
  Czech Republic  935  9 
  Hungary   944  10 
  Latvia 941  11 
  Lithuania 946  12 
  Estonia 939  13 
  Malta   181  14 
  Poland   964  15 
  Slovak Republic  936  16 
  Slovenia 961  17 
East Asia  China 924  18 
  Hongkong 532  19 
  Indonesia 536  20 
  Korea 542  21 
  Malaysia 548  22 
  Philippines 566  23 
  Singapore 576  24 
  Taiwan 528  25 
  Thailand 578  26 
Latin America  Argentina 213  27 
  Bolivia 218  28 
  Brazil 223  29 
  Chile 228  30 
  Colombia 233  31 
  Ecuador 248  32 
  Paraguay 288  33 
  Peru 293  34 
  Uruguay 298  35 
  Venezuela 299  36 
Note: Serbia and Montenegro were removed due to insufficient data.  Table 2: GLS Estimation Results for the Emerging Europe 1994 – 2005 (Euro) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































    






































































Observations  180 180 184 184 192 192 200 200 
Number  of  id  16 16 17 17 16 16 17 17 
R²  within  0.438 0.438 0.429 0.421 0.392 0.393 0.197 0.142 
R²  between  0.296 0.292 0.329 0.333 0.184 0.129 0.324 0.318 
R²  overall  0.342 0.340 0.332 0.333 0.336 0.313 0.216 0.164 
Data source: IMF, national central banks. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.  
  24 Table 3: GMM - Two Step Estimation Results for Emerging Europe 1994 – 2005 (Euro) 



















































    






































































Observations  151 153 153 153 160 160 167 167 
Number  of  id  16 17 17 17 16 16 17 17 
Sargan  test  Chi² 6.62 8.11 12.44  10.48 6.31  7.49 13.53  14.93 
Prob  >  Chi²  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(2)  0.993 0.733 0.635 0.929 0.320 0.339 0.459 0.568 
Data source: IMF, national central banks. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.  
  25 Table 4: GLS Estimation Results for the Emerging Europe 1994 – 2005 (Min) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































    






































































Observations  184 184 184 184 197 197 200 200 
Number  of  id  17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
R²  within  0.435 0.428 0.432 0.416 0.383 0.376 0.194 0.139 
R²  between  0.355 0.359 0.333 0.343 0.271 0.211 0.333 0.325 
R²  overall  0.354 0.346 0.344 0.337 0.345 0.318 0.214 0.163 
Data source: IMF, national central banks. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.  
  26 Table 5: GMM - Two Step Estimation Results for Emerging Europe 1994 – 2005 (Min) 



















































    






































































Observations  153 153 153 153 164 164 167 167 
Number  of  id  17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Sargan  test  Chi²  8.66 10.23 13.82 13.71 10.07 11.08 13.26 15.49 
Prob  >  Chi²  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(2)  0.931 0.248 0.558 0.448 0.597 0.229 0.471 0.554 





  27 Table 6: GLS Estimation Results for East Asia 1980 – 2005 (Dollar) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































    






































































Observations  210 210 216 216 218 218 234 234 
Number  of  id  9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
R²  within  0.534 0.487 0.509 0.444 0.526 0.482 0.284 0.242 
R²  between  0.313 0.526 0.272 0.383 0.423 0.509 0.069 0.128 
R²  overall  0.481 0.478 0.456 0.434 0.500 0.481 0.250 0.223 
Data source: IMF, national central banks. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
 
  28 Table 7: GLS Estimation Results for East Asia and Latin America 1980 – 2005 (Dollar) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































    






































































Observations  418 418 424 424 448 448 470 470 
Number  of  id  19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
R²  within  0.305 0.272 0.286 0.265 0.253 0.255 0.141 0.143 
R²  between  0.708 0.782 0.749 0.753 0.753 0.769 0.628 0.624 
R²  overall  0.357 0.324 0.338 0.318 0.303 0.306 0.195 0.199 








  29 Table 8: GMM - Two Step Estimation Results for East Asia and Latin America 1986 – 2005 (Dollar) 



















































    






































































Observations  331 331 331 331 338 338 338 338 
Number  of  id  19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Sargan  test  Chi² 11.56 13.56 12.84 13.15 13.56 13.56 15.82 16.30 
Prob  >  Chi²  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(2)  0.175 0.246 0.090 0.114 0.071 0.117 0.042 0.043 
Data source: IMF, national central banks. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
  30  
Table 9: GLS Estimation Results for Emerging Europe (Euro) and East Asia (Dollar) 1994 – 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































    






































































Observations  288 288 292 292 300 300 308 308 
Number  of  id  25 25 26 26 25 25 26 26 
R²  within  0.426 0.425 0.409 0.397 0.398 0.399 0.193 0.188 
R²  between  0.279 0.282 0.269 0.275 0.182 0.161 0.252 0.234 
R²  overall  0.354 0.354 0.328 0.326 0.346 0.338 0.201 0.194 
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Table 10: GMM - Two Step Estimation Results for Emerging Europe (Euro) and East Asia (Dollar) 1994 – 2005 



















































    






































































Observations  241 241 243 243 250 250 257 257 
Number  of  id  25 25 26 26 25 25 26 26 
Sargan  test  Chi² 19.81 18.78 24.26 22.35 17.72 18.66 20.47 23.89 
Prob  >  Chi²  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(2)  0.959 0.529 0.700 0.877 0.486 0.559 0.990 0.996 
Data source: IMF, national central banks. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.  
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